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• Analyses and criticizes Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen's account of theory-building process-tracing.
• Clariﬁes the concepts of causal mechanism and middle-range theory that are employed in case studies.
• Proposes an improved account of how middle-range theories about causal mechanisms may be built through process-tracing.
1. Introduction
Social scientists often consider case studies as sources of new the-
ories (e.g. Beach & Pedersen, 2013, 2016; Becker, 2014; George &
Bennett, 2005; Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). However, the procedures
whereby new theories are built from case studies are not well under-
stood. In this paper, I address the question of how process-tracing can
be employed in developing new middle-range theories in the social
sciences. Process-tracing is a method for analyzing sequences of events
and causal mechanisms in single-case research designs. Middle-range
theories, in turn, have been frequently construed as semi-general the-
ories that aim to represent causal mechanisms.
My focus is on political scientists Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun
Pedersen's (2013; 2016) recent account of theory-building process-tra-
cing that provides a detailed discussion of how process-tracing can be
used to construct new middle-range theories about causal mechanisms.
While acknowledging their important contributions to the case study
methods and the literature on theory-building, I indicate that their
notions of middle-range theory and causal mechanism are ambiguous
and problematic. My main argument is that Beach and Pedersen's ac-
count of theory-building process-tracing can be improved by clarifying
and further developing the concepts of middle-range theory and causal
mechanism.
In particular, I show that Beach and Pedersen tend to conﬂate causal
mechanisms with middle-range theories (that aim to represent causal
mechanisms) even though they are committed to an ontic notion of
causal mechanism. As a result, they do not clarify the nature of those
middle-range theories that are constructed in theory-building process-
tracing. I point out that this ambiguity has its roots in their descriptions
of causal mechanisms that also include other problems. They decom-
pose causal mechanisms into two types of parts without clearly separ-
ating them. Furthermore, they problematically assume that causal
mechanisms transmit causal forces and suggest that causal mechanisms
in theory-building process-tracing can be best represented in terms of
singular and linear sequences of distinct temporal parts that link causes
to outcomes. As a consequence, Beach and Pedersen fail to provide
conceptual tools for theorizing mechanisms of social processes that
include feedback loops and other types of non-linear interactions.
In the latter part of the paper, I argue that these problems and
ambiguities can be avoided by understanding a causal mechanism in
terms of its component entities (with properties) whose activities and
interactions produce a speciﬁc type of outcome in suitable contexts. I
also provide an account of middle-range theories, according to which
they consist of three evolving parts that serve diﬀerent epistemic
functions in social research, and illustrate it by discussing the so-called
democratic peace theory. Finally, I show how these notions can be
employed in developing an improved approach to theory-building
process-tracing.
2. Theory-building and middle-range theories in the social
sciences
Many attempts have been made to expound general principles and
methods for building new theories in the social sciences (for a review,
see Swedberg, 2014). Many social scientists have assumed that case
studies oﬀer promising opportunities for theory-building (e.g. Beach &
Pedersen, 2013; George & Bennett, 2005). However, no consensus has
emerged about the proper methods of theory-building. Many of the
traditional accounts of theory-building have faced severe critiques —
the grounded theory approach is a case in point (see Timmermans &
Tavory, 2012). Moreover, drawing on philosopher Hans Reichenbach's
(1938) inﬂuential distinction between the context of discovery and the
context of justiﬁcation, some social scientists and philosophers tend to
regard the methodological discussion on the normative methods for
theory-building as misguided. At the same time, the distinction un-
derlying this view has been forcefully criticized in the philosophy of
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science and methodology of the social sciences.
Even if we reject a strict separation between two contexts of re-
search and allow that discovery processes can be rationally analyzed, it
may still be wise to consider the methods of theory-building and the
methods of theory-testing separately. The reason is that many methods
for testing theories in the social sciences require that researchers have
formulated competing theoretical hypotheses that are tested against
each other by using evidence acquired independently of the processes
of building the theories of which the tested hypotheses are derived
from. It has also turned out to be more diﬃcult to develop standardized
procedures for theory-building than for theory-testing. For these rea-
sons, I assume that the methods of theory-building can be analytically
separated from the methods of theory-testing although I do not deny
that both types of methods can be used in a single study.
The concept of middle-range theory was coined by sociologist
Robert K. Merton (1948) in a paper that criticized sociologist Talcott
Parsons' approach to social theory. Merton's core point was that so-
ciologists would do better if they concentrated on developing many
semi-general theories about bounded ranges of social phenomena ra-
ther than try to develop “total systems of sociological theory” whose
objective is to unify and explain all social phenomena. Nevertheless, he
also criticized such raw empiricism which replaces explanatory theories
with isolated empirical generalizations. Though many social scientists
believe that Merton's ideas on middle-range theories still form an im-
portant blueprint for connecting theory-building with empirical ana-
lysis in social research, no agreement has been reached about how this
concept should be deﬁned (e.g. George & Bennett, 2005; Hedström,
2005; Hedström & Udehn, 2009; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Pawson,
2000). In the next section, I brieﬂy revisit Merton's original views of
middle-range theories and identify a tension in them. Then I indicate
some diﬀerences between how this concept is used in contemporary
sociology and political science respectively.
According to Merton's (1968, 39) often cited characterization,
middle-range theories “lie between the minor but necessary working
hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and
the all-inclusive systematic eﬀorts to develop a uniﬁed theory that will
explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organi-
zation and social change.” In addition to indicating what middle-range
theories are not, Merton describes some positive features and functions
of this type of theory. He writes, for example, that middle-range the-
ories guide empirical research (Merton, 1968, 39) and generate theo-
retical problems for sociologists to study (Merton, 1968, 45). He further
states that they allow sociologists to identify gaps in their knowledge as
well as to consolidate separate hypotheses and theoretical general-
izations into networks of interrelated sociological theories (Merton,
1968, 68). Still, following the hypothetico-deductive model of scientiﬁc
method, Merton deﬁnes middle-range theories in static terms, writing
that they “consist of limited sets of assumptions from which speciﬁc
hypotheses are logically derived and conﬁrmed by empirical in-
vestigation” (Merton, 1968, 68).
In recent discussions, middle-range theories are often re-interpreted
utilizing the mechanistic approach to explanation that also has some
roots in Merton's work (e.g. Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Udehn, 2009;
Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Pawson, 2000). Drawing on these ideas, I
have elsewhere proposed that, in order to do justice to diﬀerent func-
tions of middle-range theories in social research, we should reject
Merton's single function and static deﬁnition of the concept of middle-
range theory and decompose middle-range theories into three evolving
parts that perform diﬀerent epistemic functions in social research
(Kaidesoja, 2018). This proposal is in line with Merton's (e.g. 1968)
developmental approach to theorizing. I will later come back to this
view.
Despite the common assumption that middle-range theories are
theories about causal mechanisms, there are systematic diﬀerences in
how this concept is used in contemporary sociology and political sci-
ence. When discussing middle-range theories, analytical sociologists
emphasize the importance of specifying the micro-foundations of
macro-level social phenomena in terms of the individual-level causal
mechanisms that are assumed to underlie or produce these phenomena.
For the purposes of studying mechanisms of this kind, they tend to
apply formal methods and agent-based modeling, often inspired by
(broad versions of) rational choice theory, and test their theoretical
models with large-N data (e.g. Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Bearman
2009). These methodological views presuppose that causal mechanisms
are relatively context-independent, in the sense that the same causal
mechanism is assumed to operate in a variety of diﬀerent contexts. By
contrast, political scientists, especially in the ﬁelds of international
relations and comparative politics, often build middle-range theories in
which causal properties and activities are attributed to large-scale so-
cial formations, such as states, governments, political parties or poli-
tical institutions. Many of them build and test middle-range theories by
using case study designs, process-tracing and small-N comparative
methods. These methodological views presuppose that causal me-
chanisms are relatively dependent on speciﬁc contexts. In this ap-
proach, then, middle-range theories about causal mechanisms tend to
be less abstract and general than those developed by analytical so-
ciologists (e.g. Beach & Pedersen, 2013, 2016; Checkel & Bennett, 2014;
George & Bennett, 2005). Though these two approaches can be seen as
complementary rather than competing, I will focus mostly on the latter
understanding of middle-range theories.
3. Case studies, cases and process-tracing
Case studies can be understood as empirical inquiries where social
scientists investigate in depth a single case, or a small number of cases,
of a social phenomenon by combining many diﬀerent types of data
sources. This kind of deﬁnition is commonly used in discussions on
process-tracing methods (e.g. Beach & Pedersen, 2013, 2016; Bennett &
Checkel, 2015; George & Bennett, 2005). Case studies mostly utilize
non-statistical methods (i.e. qualitative or small-N comparative
methods) of data analysis even though there is no single “case study
method” but rather multiple methods that can be employed in case
study research designs.
A case may be understood as an instance or an example of a social
phenomenon. The notion of social phenomenon encompasses types of
social events, social processes, social situations, social relations, social
practices, social organizations and broader social formations. Hence,
what is a case depends on how social scientists conceptualize and
classify social phenomena, meaning that a social phenomenon is iden-
tiﬁed by describing its key attributes and how it diﬀers from the other,
closely related phenomena. This characterization does not pose any
restrictions to the size of a case: a case may be either small or big or
somewhere in between in terms of geographical and temporal scales.
Hence, cases studied in the social sciences range from instances of small
group decision-making processes and local social movements to in-
stances of political revolutions, wars and even civilizations. It is also
possible that a theorized phenomenon has only one known instance
although social scientists usually aim at identifying social phenomena
that have many instances. This allows them to generalize across cases.
Process-tracing is a method that is used in a single case research
design to analyze sequences of events and causal mechanisms by using
heterogeneous evidence from diﬀerent sources (e.g. Beach & Pedersen,
2013; Bennett & Checkel, 2015; Waldner, 2012). In case studies that
employ process-tracing, the cases studied are instances of social pro-
cesses. It has been also argued that process-tracing allows within-case
causal inferences about the parts of a causal mechanism in a case by
means of a Bayesian approach to conﬁrmation (e.g. Beach & Pedersen,
2013; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Nevertheless, this approach is some-
what controversial. In this paper, I assume with Beach and Pedersen
(2013; 2016) that the notion of within-case causal inference makes
sense, but I do not discuss their Bayesian account of conﬁrmation.
Although many social scientists hold that process-tracing is a
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promising method for developing new middle-range theories (e.g.
Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Checkel & Bennett, 2015; George & Bennett,
2005), philosophers of social science have mostly focused on the issues
whether and how process-tracing can be used to justify causal gen-
eralizations from case studies and cross-case causal inferences (e.g.
Guala, 2010; Ruzzene, 2012; Steel, 2008). Though I do not deny the
importance of these latter issues, it is essential to recognize that they do
not cover all philosophical questions regarding the uses of process-
tracing in social research. Unless we assume that creative processes in
science are impossible to analyze rationally, we need to address the
question: where do new explanatory theories come from? In this paper,
I will mostly bracket the issues pertaining to the justiﬁcation of causal
generalizations from case studies. This allows me to concentrate on the
issues that arise when process-tracing is used for building potentially
generalizable theories of the middle-range in single case research de-
signs.
4. Beach and Pedersen on theory-building process-tracing
In methodological discussions within social sciences, process-tra-
cing is often assumed to be a (more or less) uniﬁed method. Beach and
Pedersen (2013, 3) question this assumption by contending that “[a] lot
of murkiness about what process tracing is and how it should be used in
practice can be cleared up by diﬀerentiating process-tracing into three
variants within social sciences: theory-testing, theory-building and ex-
plaining outcome.” Since theory-building process-tracing can be spe-
ciﬁed by considering its similarities and diﬀerences with the other
variants of process-tracing, I will take a brief look at all three ways of
using process-tracing before I move on to discuss this particular variant
in detail.1
Beach and Pedersen (2013, 2) construe all variants of process-tra-
cing as “tools to study causal mechanisms in single-case research de-
signs.” Since all of them include hypothetical inferences about the
presence of causal mechanisms in a studied case, they can be all used to
provide mechanism-based explanations of the outcomes of social pro-
cesses. Despite these common features, Beach and Pedersen suggest that
we should distinguish between three uses of process-tracing because
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their epistemic aims, inferential
structures, and assumptions about causal mechanisms.
Theory-testing process-tracing aims at empirically evaluating an al-
ready theorized causal mechanism that is hypothesized to be present in
“a population of cases of a phenomenon” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013,
11). After the causal mechanism has been operationalized in a case-
speciﬁc manner, theory-testing process-tracing is used to determine
whether the empirical predictions, deductively derived from the theo-
rized mechanism, are supported by the case-based empirical evidence
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 14–15). In theory-building process-tracing,
the case-based materials and earlier research are employed in con-
structing a potentially generalizable causal mechanism which is in-
ferred to be present in the studied case if the case-based evidence
supports it (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 3, 16–18). Hence, theory-
building process-tracing is said to “uncover middle-range theories for-
mulated as a causal mechanism that works within a bounded context”
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 61).
The limitations of these two variants of process-tracing are similar
since neither of them alone can be used to generalize the theorized
causal mechanism to other cases. The reasons are that the same type of
outcome may have been produced by diﬀerent causal mechanisms in
diﬀerent cases and that the same causal mechanism may produce dif-
ferent outcomes in diﬀerent contexts if the contextual conditions are
diﬀerent (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 54; 153–154). In addition, neither
of these variants allow us to infer whether the hypothesized causal
mechanism is a suﬃcient cause of the outcome in the studied case al-
though they enable us to make strong within-case inferences about the
presence and functioning of the theorized mechanism in the studied
case (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 89–91).
Finally, explaining-outcome process-tracing is used to develop com-
prehensive explanations for puzzling outcomes in speciﬁc historical
cases that are considered substantially important (Beach and Pedersen,
2013, 3, 145). These kinds of explanations typically combine many
diﬀerent causal mechanisms whose eclectic conglomerates are said to
form “case-speciﬁc mechanisms”,2 meaning that these explanations
“cannot be detached from the particular case” (Beach and Pedersen,
2013, 19). Though the name of this variant is somewhat misleading,
given that all variants of process-tracing can be used to provide me-
chanism-based explanations of outcomes in cases, the key idea here is
that explaining-outcome process-tracing aims at explaining all inter-
esting aspects of a particular historical case without attempting to de-
velop or test generalizable theories. This sort of “case-centric” focus is
said to distinguish the research designs that utilize explaining-outcome
process-tracing from the “theory-centric” designs where the other two
variants are employed (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 12).
Let us now zoom in to theory-building process-tracing. According to
Beach and Pedersen (2013, 16), theory-building process-tracing is “an
inductive method” that “seeks to build a midrange theory describing
causal mechanism that is generalizable outside the individual case to a
bounded context.” They also write that “[i]n its purest form, theory-
building process-tracing starts with empirical material and uses a
structured analysis of this material to detect a plausible hypothetical
causal mechanism whereby X [which is a type of cause] is linked with Y
[which is a type of outcome]” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 16). In ad-
dition, theory-building process-tracing can be combined with theory-
testing process-tracing and the small-N comparative methods in case
study research designs (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 61).
In their later work, Beach and Pedersen (2016, 15–16; 31; 303–304)
explicitly distinguish between “within-case mechanistic evidence” and
“diﬀerence-making evidence”, drawing on some discussions in the
mechanistic philosophy of science (e.g. Russo & Williamson, 2007). The
key idea is that mechanistic evidence produced in case studies enables
us to make inferences about the presence/absence of the parts of the
hypothesized causal mechanism in a single case. The production of this
kind of evidence does not require that the case under study is compared
to any other cases. In contrast, diﬀerence making evidence produced in
randomized controlled experiments that use randomly assigned test and
control groups allows us to make (counterfactual) inferences about the
average eﬀects of the changes of the values of the independent variable
on the values of the dependent variable in a particular population.
However, diﬀerence-making evidence alone does not enable us to infer
how, or through which causal mechanism(s), particular outcomes are
produced in particular cases. Hence, mechanistic evidence is the most
important type of evidence for theory-building process-tracing since it
concerns causal mechanisms rather than dependencies between popu-
lation-level variables (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, pp. 303–304). Ac-
cording to Beach and Pedersen (2013, 132–143), this type of case-based
and non-standardized evidence can be acquired from many com-
plementary sources, including interviews, archives, memoirs, public
speeches, newspapers and earlier historical studies. Insofar as these
sources are independent from each other, mechanistic evidence from
diﬀerent sources can be triangulated.
In practice, theory-building process-tracing can be used in two types
of research situations (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 16, 60):
1 In their recent book, Beach and Pedersen (2016, Chapter 9) distinguish a
fourth variant of process-tracing method which is named as “theory-revising
process-tracing”. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, it is suﬃcient to
restrict attention to three variants of process-tracings.
2 In my view, we should use here the term ‘causal narrative’ instead of ‘causal
mechanism’, but I will not argue for this point here because it is not important
for the main arguments of the paper.
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1) A correlation between X and Y is empirically established but the
causal mechanism that might link them is not known
2) Y is known but X and the causal mechanism that might link X and Y
are both unknown.
In both types of situations, the analyst seeks to theorize a causal
mechanism by means of studying a case that she assumes to instantiate
the causal mechanism. Nevertheless, there are diﬀerences in the pro-
cedures of selecting cases for study in these two situations.
Beach and Pedersen (2013, 154) argue that in the situation type 1,
the analyst should select a case of the phenomenon that she considers
typical, in the sense that she can assume that X and Y are both present
in the case. They illustrate this type of theory-building process-tracing
by discussing Irving Janis' (1982[1972]) theory of groupthink that he
built by analyzing, among other cases, how the Kennedy administration
in the U.S. arrived at bad decisions that led to the failed Bay of Pigs
invasion in Cuba in 1961. According to Beach and Pedersen (2013,
61–63), the theory of groupthink describes a causal mechanism
whereby poor decision-making in tightly-knit small groups (X) leads to
bad policy decisions (Y) in situations where the members experience
conformity pressure and fail to question their problematic assumptions.
In the situation type 2, the analyst is advised to select a case that is
deviant, in the sense that it is surprising in the light of her background
knowledge about the research domain (Beach and Pedersen, 2013,
154–156). Beach and Pedersen illustrate theory-building process-tra-
cing in this type of situations by discussing a hypothetical case where
democracy has been found in a non-developing country. They consider
this case deviant because it is incompatible with the widely held the-
oretical expectation in political science that economic development of a
country contributes to its democratization. Hence, the analyst faces
here, not only the task of providing an account of the cause (X) for a
democracy in a non-developing country (Y), but also the task of theo-
rizing a causal mechanism for how X produces Y in the studied case
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 155). It is obvious that these types of si-
tuations may emerge as byproducts of the case studies that employ
theory-testing process-tracing.
Beach and Pedersen’s (2013, 16–18; 60–63) account of theory-
building process-tracing can be summarized by separating three steps:
1) Deﬁnition of the concepts of a cause X and an outcome Y, or at least
the concept of an outcome Y, in terms of positive and causally re-
levant attributes; selection of a suitable case by employing back-
ground knowledge of the research domain; construction of an em-
pirical narrative that describes a sequence of observable events
between the instances of X and Y in the studied case.
2) Inference that the temporal parts in the empirical narrative are
empirical manifestations of the parts of a hypothesized causal me-
chanism that might be present in the case; conceptualization of the
causal mechanism by specifying all of its parts that are needed to
link X to Y in the studied case, using the terms that refer to entities
engaged in activities.
3) Inference from the relevant empirical evidence that the hypothe-
sized causal mechanism as a whole is present in the case and,
thereby, provides a mechanism-based explanation of the case.
Beach and Pedersen acknowledge that theory-building seldom
proceeds in a straightforward manner since “steps 1 and 2 are often
repeated before the step 3 is reached” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 18).
They also suggest that the elimination of competing mechanism-based
explanations is not usually necessary in the third step for two reasons.
First, they allow that there may be other complementary causes and
mechanisms that also contributed to the outcome of Y in the case which
are not addressed in theory-building process-tracing. Second, they note
that it is uncommon that researchers employing theory-centric process-
tracing are able to build two or more comparable and competing me-
chanisms with the same number of mutually exclusive temporal parts
that are both proposed to explain all case-based facts (Beach and
Pedersen, 2013, 89–90). Assessment of the sources and quality of the
case-based mechanistic evidence, in turn, is used to determine how
conﬁdent one can be about the third step.
Although it is a useful ﬁrst attempt at codifying theory-building
process-tracing, Beach and Pedersen's account contains some ambi-
guities and problematic assumptions that motivate the following dis-
cussion. In particular, they tend to conﬂate middle-range theories with
causal mechanisms. This is problematic because they also accept an
ontic view of causal mechanisms which implies that causal mechanisms
cannot be theories. Accordingly, they fail to properly address the con-
cept of middle-range theory (apart from the concept of causal me-
chanism). Since these and some other problems and lacunas in Beach
and Pedersen's approach are rooted in their conception of causal me-
chanism, I take a closer look at it.
5. Beach and Pedersen on causal mechanisms
Beach and Pedersen (2013; 2016) subscribe to a mechanistic and
deterministic notion of causation.3 From this viewpoint, they deﬁne a
causal mechanism “as a theory of a system of interlocking parts that
transmits causal forces from X to Y” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 26;
also 2016, 34–35). They illustrate this view by discussing, among other
examples, “the capture causal mechanism” that relates to studies on
democratization and its obstacles. Their description of this mechanism
is based on Daniel Ziblatt's (2009) study on parliamentary elections in
Imperial Germany in 1871–1912. Ziblatt's study aims to explain how
local oﬃcials were captured by landed elites to perpetrate electoral
fraud in parliamentary elections during this period when landowner-
ship relations were highly unequal. Beach and Pedersen (2016, 78)
criticize Ziblatt for not detailing the capture causal mechanism through
which electoral frauds are institutionalized. Their own hypothetical
description of the capture mechanism aims to remedy this shortcoming
by splitting the mechanism into two parts: (i) landed elites who seek to
preserve their electoral dominance put pressure on local oﬃcials and
(ii) local public oﬃcials — such as mayors, county commissioners,
police oﬃcials, and election oﬃcials — exploit the powers of their of-
ﬁce to interfere in elections in order to beneﬁt landed elites (see Fig. 1).
The outcome of this two-step mechanism is the institutionalized sub-
version of free and fair elections as local oﬃcials are captured by landed
elites.4 The contexts where this particular mechanism is expected to
operate are characterized as situations where the traditional social
power in rural areas, based on highly unequal landownership relations,
is eroding.
The above deﬁnition suggests that causal mechanisms are theories.
Nevertheless, I think Beach and Pedersen (2013; 2016) are actually (or
at least they should be given their other views) committed to an ontic
view of causal mechanisms, according to which a causal mechanism is
“a system of interlocking parts that transmits causal forces from X to Y”
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 26) rather than a theory about such a system.
Otherwise, it is hard to see how causal mechanisms can transmit any-
thing or link causes to their eﬀects. The ontic view, then, grants that we
need middle-range theories to discover and represent causal mechanisms
but refuses to equate causal mechanisms with our theories. The dis-
tinction between causal mechanisms and our theoretical representa-
tions of them is important for analyzing how middle-range theories
about causal mechanisms are built through process-tracing since it
enables us to clearly separate our assumptions about causal
3 Though Beach and Pedersen's (2013; 2016) views on causation may not be
entirely unproblematic, I do not consider them here.
4 In Fig. 1, Beach and Pedersen claim that the outcome of this mechanism is
simply “electoral fraud”. This is misleading since the outcome of interest is
rather “an institutionalized system of electoral manipulation and control”
(Ziblatt, 2009, p. 15).
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mechanisms and our assumptions about middle-range theories.
Assuming the ontic account of causal mechanisms, Beach and
Pedersen’s (2013, Chapter 3) conception of causal mechanisms can be
reconstructed in terms of three basic assumptions:
1) A causal mechanism links a cause X to its outcome Y.
2) A causal mechanism consists of entities engaged in activities that are
organized into a singular sequence of a delimited number of tem-
poral parts between X and Y.
3) A causal mechanism transmits causal forces.
In what follows, I take a closer look at these assumptions and
identify some problems in them.
The ﬁrst two assumptions seem too restricted for the purposes of
social research since they ﬁt only the mechanisms of social processes
with clear temporal boundaries and distinct temporal parts that to-
gether form a singular sequence. This restriction is problematic because
there are many ongoing social processes that do not have clearly
identiﬁable temporal boundaries nor non-parallel sequences of clearly
identiﬁable temporal parts. Markets, fashion and various social pro-
cesses that produce diﬀerent types of segregations and inequalities
among individuals, social groups or residential areas are well-known
cases in point. Though we may theorize the causal mechanisms that
drive the ongoing social processes of these kinds by studying the tem-
poral slices of their instances that we may construe as our cases, it is
important to realize that these processes as such do not have clearly
identiﬁable starting points nor end points. Furthermore, since the on-
going social processes of these kinds usually involve spatially dis-
tributed and temporally parallel social actions of large numbers of
diﬀerent types of social actors whose complex interactions produce
unintended and unanticipated consequences (see Hedström, 2005;
Hedström & Bearman 2009), it does not seem appropriate to represent
their causal mechanisms in terms of singular sequences of distinct
temporal parts in which each part is considered a speciﬁc type of entity
engaged in one or more activities.
Although Beach and Pedersen (2013, 29) admit that “the trans-
mission of causal forces can be nonlinear through the mechanism” and
brieﬂy discuss threshold mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen, 2013,
55–56), they do not provide conceptual tools for representing causal
mechanisms that include nonlinear interactions. Their template for
describing causal mechanisms (exempliﬁed in Fig. 1) is also most sui-
table for causal mechanisms that consist of linear sequences of temporal
parts. These are considerable restrictions since many of the most in-
teresting causal mechanisms studied in the social sciences include non-
linear interactions, such as self-reinforcing feedback loops. The well-
known mechanisms of accumulation of advantage, of bandwagon ef-
fect, of residential segregation and of path-dependent increasing returns
are cases in point. Hence, it is problematic to assume that in successful
theory-building process-tracing analysts are able to construct case-
based empirical narratives whose parts manifest the temporal parts of
underlying causal mechanisms since this view seem to presuppose that
all causal mechanisms consist of the linear sequences of temporally
distinct parts.
An additional problem regarding assumption (2) can be identiﬁed
by considering Beach and Pedersen's claim that causal mechanisms can
be understood “in terms of a system that produces an outcome through
the interaction of a series of parts of the mechanisms” where each part
“is composed of entities that engage in activities” (Beach and Pedersen,
2013, 39). They diﬀerentiate these “series of parts of the mechanisms”
from the sequences that consist of “empirical events that are temporally
and spatially located between the occurrence of X and the outcome of
Y” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 33). The idea here seems to be that the
term “empirical event” refers to observable occurrences (or token
events) while the term “causal mechanism” refers to the abstract
properties of many causally homogenous processes. These abstract
properties in turn are assumed to “underlie” the sequences of ob-
servable occurrences. Be this as it may, my worry is that Beach and
Pedersen's assumption (2) creates confusion since — as the cited claim
illustrates— it implies that causal mechanisms have two diﬀerent kinds
of parts: component entities that are able to engage in various activities
in virtue of their dispositional properties (hereafter: part1) and tem-
poral slices of entities that are engaged in a speciﬁc type of activity for a
speciﬁc period of time (hereafter: part2).
Though Beach and Pedersen nowhere clearly separate them, there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these two kinds of mechanism parts:
A part1 (e.g. a political party with speciﬁc interests) may be a compo-
nent of many causal mechanisms whereas a part2 (e.g. a political party
whose leaders negotiate with those of the other party in order to form a
coalition government) may not be uncoupled from a particular (type of)
causal mechanism (e.g. coalition formation). Parts1 may also be said to
interact with each other while parts2 may precede or follow one another
rather than interact with each other. Furthermore, the ongoing causal
mechanisms, which do not have a clearly identiﬁable sequential
structure (i.e. parts2), are still composed of the entities (i.e. parts1) that
interact with each other.
Beach and Pedersen's (e.g. 2013, 30–31) conﬂation of parts1 with
parts2 aﬀects how they describe their exemplary causal mechanisms
and advice to other researchers on how to represent causal mechanisms.
For example, in their description of the capture causal mechanism in
Fig. 1, they depict those activities that landed elites and local oﬃcials
engage in, but they do not describe the beliefs and desires of local of-
ﬁcials that would explain why they decided to exploit the powers of
their oﬃce to beneﬁt landed elites. It seems to me that the speciﬁcation
of the types of desires and beliefs of local oﬃcials ― that enable us to
understand why they acted as they did― would have provided a deeper
explanation of the institutionalization of electoral frauds. This omission
is not surprising since Beach and Pedersen’s (2013, 40; also 2016, 80)
template for (representing) causal mechanisms includes only activities
and entities but not properties of entities. Hence, in order avoid con-
fusions and unnecessary biases, I suggest that parts2 of causal me-
chanisms can be better termed as their stages and that the term ‘me-
chanism part’ should only be used to refer to parts1. I will henceforth
employ this distinction.
Furthermore, although it is plausible to assume that causal me-
chanisms studied in the social sciences consist of entities and activities
that are temporally and spatially organized to produce a speciﬁc type of
outcome, it seems misleading to claim that the activities of social en-
tities “transmit causal forces through the mechanism” (e.g. Beach &
Pedersen, 2013, p. 39; 29 cf. Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 12). Perhaps
the most charitable interpretation is to regard this notion as a metaphor
that highlights the productive continuity of causal mechanisms.
Nevertheless, the relevant type of productive continuity of causal me-
chanisms in this context is not best described in terms of transmission of
causal forces, since there is a variety of diﬀerent types of items that may
be transmitted in social activities and interactions, such as ideas, skills,
diseases, property rights, obligations or money. It is simply misleading
to conceptualize them all as “causal force” since this metaphorical ex-
pression has its origin in the notion of physical force that invites us to
Fig. 1. Capture causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 83).
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think mechanical machines which provide an inadequate model of so-
cial interactions. Moreover, there seem to be causal relations that do
not involve the transmission of anything. For example, the structure of
a social network may well be said to be among the causes that can be
cited in explanations of the observed diﬀerences of the diﬀusion rate of
an innovation in diﬀerent populations even though the network struc-
ture as such does not transmit anything.
6. An elaborated account of causal mechanisms
I suggest that Peter Hedström’s (2005, 25) concise deﬁnition pro-
vides us with a good point of departure for developing an alternative
account of causal mechanisms:
mechanisms can be said to consist of entities (with their properties)
and the activities that these entities engage in, either by themselves
or in concert with other entities. These activities bring about
change, and the type of change brought about depends upon the
properties of the entities and the way in which they are linked to one
another.
This ontic deﬁnition draws on Peter Machamer's and his colla-
borators inﬂuential article on causal mechanisms (i.e. Machamer,
Lindley, & Craver, 2000). It implies that causal mechanisms are neither
intervening variables nor theories. Accordingly, the entities that are the
component parts of a causal mechanism are assumed to have suitable
causal properties that enable them to engage in their activities.
The above deﬁnition does not require that all causal mechanisms
should be understood in terms of linear and non-parallel sequences of
stages that link causes to their outcomes. Nor does it demand that the
component entities in causal mechanisms studied in the social sciences
are always human individuals even though this view is advocated by
Hedström (2005). Although causal mechanisms that consist of inter-
acting individuals (with desires and beliefs) and their interlinked ac-
tivities are important for explanatory social research, I do not see any
problem in using the concept of entity to refer to suitably organized
groups, or collective agents, that may function as component parts of
some causal mechanisms studied in the social sciences (Kaidesoja,
2013). Furthermore, the above deﬁnition is also compatible with the
view that causal mechanisms are more or less context-dependent.
In contrast to the notion of transmission of causal forces through the
stages of causal mechanisms, it is enough to require that the activities
and interactions of entities consist of productive links through which the
mechanism generates the phenomenon or connects the cause X to the
outcome Y. Since the core entities in causal mechanisms studied in the
social sciences are culturally embedded social actors, the productive
links often consist of the intentional actions and (often technologically
mediated) sociocultural interactions of these actors. For these reasons,
there may also be time lags between the stages of mechanisms that
follow one another (e.g. a causal link between the consecutive stages
may consist of written communication), meaning that these stages do
not always manifest themselves in the form of sequences of observable
token events in the studied cases.
It is also important to separate concrete social processes (shortly:
social processes) from causal mechanisms that drive or underlie these
processes. A social process consists of tokens of entities, activities, in-
teractions and outcomes in a speciﬁc context, while its causal me-
chanism is usually theoretically represented in terms of types of entities,
activities, interactions and outcomes in a way that abstracts from the
contingent features of the social processes and their contexts. Hence,
the concepts that refer to types of entities and activities allow us to
theorize the crucial properties, activities and interactions of entities in a
causal mechanism through which it is able to produce its outcomes in
diﬀerent cases of the class of causally homogenous social processes that
instantiate it. In addition, some social mechanisms may be clearly
bounded and can be represented in terms of the linear sequences of
stages while other social mechanisms include feedback loops and/or
other non-linear interactions.
Beach and Pedersen's (2013; 2016) understanding of causal me-
chanisms seems to reﬂect their interest in contributing to the devel-
opment of process-tracing methods that are often used to track se-
quences of events. This is not surprising since process-tracing appears to
be best suitable for studying causal mechanisms that have clearly
identiﬁable temporal boundaries and non-parallel sequences of stages
that linearly follow one another. Nevertheless, Beach and Pedersen
have not provided good reasons why we should build these assumptions
into our template for representing causal mechanisms and our account
of theory-building process-tracing. Here I have oﬀered some reasons
why we should not do this.
7. Middle-range theories and theory-building process-tracing
Now that I have developed an elaborated account of causal me-
chanisms, it is time to reconsider middle-range theories from this per-
spective. As noted above, Merton's (1968) original views contain a
tension between his single-function and static deﬁnition of the concept
of middle-range theory and his developmental approach to middle-
range theorizing that emphasizes diﬀerent epistemic functions of these
theories. I have elsewhere argued that this tension can be resolved by
decomposing a middle-range theory into three evolving components
that perform diﬀerent epistemic functions in social research:
1) A conceptual framework about social phenomena is a set of interrelated
concepts that is developed in close connection with empirical ana-
lysis.
2) A mechanism schema is an abstract description of a causal me-
chanism in terms of interacting entities and activities.
3) A cluster of mechanism-based explanations consist of all explanations
that are based on a mechanism schema(s) of the theory (Kaidesoja,
2018).
The idea is that all three components are involved when social
scientists develop new middle-range theories about causal mechanisms.
In this conception, middle-range theories can be understood and clas-
siﬁed in two diﬀerent ways. First, we may concentrate on a highly
abstract mechanism schema that is applied, often in combination with
other abstract mechanism schemas, in mechanism-based explanations
of many diﬀerent social phenomena in diﬀerent domains of research.
Second, we may focus on a particular social phenomenon, described in
terms of a domain-speciﬁc conceptual framework, and one or more
mechanism schemas that are applied in its mechanism-based explana-
tions. This distinction reﬂects the previous division between how
middle-range theories are understood among analytical sociologists,
who use formal methods and agent-based modeling combined with
large-N data, and among political scientists, who employ process-tra-
cing and comparative methods combined with single-N or small-N data.
My focus here is on the second view of middle-range theories.
Before revisiting Beach and Pedersen's account of theory-building
process-tracing, let me illustrate this view by discussing the so-called
democratic peace theory. This theory aims to establish and explain the
phenomenon that democratic states are less likely to go to war against
each other than other kinds of states. While many political scientists
maintain that this empirical generalization is one of the strongest in the
social sciences, others have challenged the existence or robustness of
the phenomenon of democratic peace in various ways (e.g. Brown et al.,
1996). My goal is not to resolve this dispute here, nor to argue for the
theory of democratic peace. I rather aim to show how this theory can be
understood as a middle-range theory with three components that per-
form diﬀerent epistemic functions.
The conceptual framework of this theory includes not only the
classiﬁcation of diﬀerent types of political regimes that enables re-
searchers to specify the key attributes of democratic regimes that dif-
ferentiate them from the other types of regimes, such as autocracies. It
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also contains descriptions of the key attributes of peaceful relations
between states and how they diﬀer from interstate war. This framework
has allowed the advocates of this theory to identify and specify the
phenomenon of democratic peace. For example, some of them have
emphasized that the concept of democratic peace only applies to those
liberal democratic states whose political elites perceive each other as
democratic and that this phenomenon is entirely compatible with the
fact that liberal democracies relatively often go to war against the states
that their political elites perceive as non-democratic (e.g. Owen, 1994).
The framework has also been reﬁned over time since there have been
long-lasting debates among political scientists as to how these inter-
related concepts should be understood. In addition, the phenomena of
democracy and war have undergone historical transformations that
have also been addressed in disputes about conceptualization of de-
mocratic peace (e.g. Brown et al., 1996).
The promoters of the democratic peace theory have not only sought
to establish the phenomenon of democratic peace by conceptualizing it
and providing evidence for its existence. They have also aimed to
identify and describe causes and causal mechanisms that explain this
phenomenon. For example, political scientist John Owen (1994), syn-
thetizing the normative and the structural theories of democratic peace,
has proposed a causal mechanism through which liberal ideas (with
speciﬁc type of content) give rise to recurrent social processes involving
speciﬁc groups of liberals (with liberal beliefs) and the domestic de-
mocratic institutions (that have been designed on the basis of liberal
ideas) that both work in parallel to constraint the activities of statesmen
and governments, such that the latter refrain from declaring war with
the other states that are perceived as democratic by the liberal political
elite of the country. I suggest that Owen's theorizing of what he calls
“the liberal mechanism” (p. 96) can be understood to form a me-
chanism schema. Since this mechanism schema includes a hypothetical
and abstract qualitative description of the institutionalized activities
and interactions of speciﬁc types of social actors that are triggered in
conditions of international crises, it can be understood as a mechanism
schema rather than as an empirical generalization or universal social
law. One of the epistemic functions of the liberal mechanism schema is
to allow the analyst to identify the relevant actors (with liberal beliefs
and perceptions of other states) and the relevant democratic institutions
(e.g. free speech and regular competitive elections) in the cases where
this mechanism is expected to operate.
Owen illustrates the liberal mechanism schema by applying it to
four cases of “war-threatening crises involving the United States from
the 1790s through World War I” (Owen, 1994, 89). These case studies
may be included in the cluster of mechanism-based explanations that
are based on the liberal mechanism schema. In these studies, Owen
identiﬁes particular individuals and social groups (with speciﬁc beliefs
and perceptions) in each case that ﬁll in the attributes of the abstractly
described types of entities and the institutionalized activities and in-
teractions they engage in. He also presents case-based mechanistic
evidence that supports the propositions that he derived from his ab-
stract representation of the liberal mechanism. The empirical applica-
tion of the mechanism schema to a case, however, does not by itself
refute the possibility that also other causes and mechanisms may op-
erate in the studied case. Owen seems to admit this since he does not
deny that, for example, the cost-beneﬁt calculations and the power
balancing mechanism emphasized by political realists may be relevant
to explanations of both the cases where war was avoided between lib-
eral democracies and the cases where liberal democracies decided to
ﬁght (or not to ﬁght) against illiberal and non-democratic states (Owen,
1994, 95–96; 121). Nevertheless, his theory implies an empirically
testable claim that these causes and mechanisms do not override the
operations of the liberal mechanism for democratic peace in cases of
international crises between such democratic states that perceive each
other as liberal democracies. Since not all political scientists agree with
Owen's explanations, some of the current debates revolving around the
democratic peace theory concern the relative merits of diﬀerent
mechanism-based explanations of particular cases.
With this example in mind, let us move on to consider how Beach
and Pedersen's (2013; 2016) descriptions of the three steps in building
middle-range theories through process-tracing can be elaborated by
employing the previous accounts of causal mechanisms and middle-
range theories.
In the ﬁrst step, as presented above, the analyst deﬁnes the concepts
of cause X and outcome Y, or the concept of outcome Y, and builds an
empirical narrative about the sequence of observable events between
the instances of X and Y in the selected case. Though Beach and
Pedersen (2013; 2016) provide guidelines for conceptualization and
operationalization of X and Y that apply to all variants of process-tra-
cing, the ﬁrst step of theory-building process-tracing can be enhanced
(at least) in two ways by using the notion of a conceptual framework
about social phenomena.
Firstly, we may address the procedures through which the analyst
invents new concepts to identify new types of social phenomena. It may
be possible to add a new concept to a domain-speciﬁc conceptual fra-
mework by specifying its key attributes and relations to closely related
concepts without making any other modiﬁcations to the framework.
Nevertheless, in situations where the analyst has identiﬁed a puzzling
outcome that is inconsistent with the expectations of the well-estab-
lished theories, she may have to develop such a new concept for the
outcome that calls into question one or more of the relevant conceptual
frameworks in the ﬁeld. For example, the conceptualization of demo-
cratic peace in modern political science not only enabled political sci-
entists to identify a relatively novel social phenomenon and to provide
evidence for its existence. It also required the questioning of “the realist
conceptual framework” in the ﬁeld of international relations that con-
ceptualizes international relations exclusively in terms of interstate
power relations in the anarchic international system where states with
conﬂicting self-interests are considered rational actors who aim to
maximize their self-interests.
Secondly, assuming with Beach and Pedersen (e.g. 2016, 26) that
we are interested in conceptualizing qualitative diﬀerences between
social phenomena rather than building variables, the notion of con-
ceptual framework may prove useful in avoiding such conceptual
stretching in which the meaning of a concept is understood so loosely
that it overlaps with the other, closely related concepts. For example,
the concept of representative democracy may be stretched to en-
compass political regimes with non-free and non-competitive elections
unless it is recognized that elections of this kind are attributes of some
autocracies, whose leaders try give an impression that their regimes are
democracies, rather than attributes of representative democracies.
Though I do not argue for these points here, it is also plausible to
suggest that an integrated conceptual framework about social phe-
nomena is needed to provide deﬁnitions of family resemblance concepts
and to develop conceptual typologies that can be used in specifying
theoretically interesting subtypes of social phenomena (cf. Beach and
Pedersen, 2016, 104–105; 344–345).
The second step in Beach and Pedersen's account of theory-building
process-tracing consists of the inference that the temporal sequence of
events described in the empirical narrative about the case manifests the
stages of a causal mechanism that might be present in the case. This
step also contains the conceptualization of the hypothesized causal
mechanism by specifying all of its stages that are needed to link X to Y
in the studied case, using the terms that refer to entities engaged in the
activities. In the following, I aim to specify this step by re-interpreting
the hypothesized causal mechanism as a new mechanism schema (cf.
Darden, 2002, S356) and by replacing Beach and Pedersen's notion of
causal mechanisms with the one presented above. These moves allow us
to reconsider the relation between the case-based empirical narratives
and the theoretical representations of causal mechanisms in theory-
building.
It should be stressed that mechanism schemas are not empirical
generalizations but theoretical constructs that specify the types of
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actors (with their properties), their activities and organized interactions
that are capable of producing a speciﬁc type of outcome in suitable
contexts (cf. Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 52–53; 61–62). Unlike the
sequences of empirically identiﬁable events, these items typically
cannot be simply abstracted from empirical materials about a particular
instance of a social process since, as indicated above, the sequences of
events may not directly manifest causal mechanisms operating in the
studied case— although in some cases they might do that, insofar as we
are studying a causal mechanism that has a sequential, non-parallel and
linear structure. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect that it is
always possible to build multiple empirical narratives about the pos-
sible pathways between causes and their outcomes in the studied case
due to the fact that all narratives are highly selective accounts of con-
crete processes. These considerations imply that the role of empirical
narratives in theory-building process-tracing is more restricted than
Beach and Pedersen (e.g. 2013, 17) tend to assume. Hence, in addition
to the case-based empirical narratives, I suggest that the building of
new mechanism schemas is signiﬁcantly facilitated and constrained by
the earlier empirical studies that are considered successful as well as by
the available theoretical resources of social scientists, including their
conceptual frameworks, generally accepted mechanism schemas and
general theoretical orientations.
The distinction between abstract mechanism schemas and causal
mechanisms that drive concrete social processes also helps us to address
the issues concerning the proper level of abstraction in our con-
ceptualization of causal mechanisms. The importance of these issues is
noticed by Beach and Pedersen (2013; 2016) but the lack of a clear
distinction between middle-range theories and causal mechanisms
prevents them from treating these issues comprehensively. I tentatively
suggest that a mechanism schema used in case studies should include
concepts that deﬁne the types of actors, including their causally re-
levant properties, and their activities that can be used in identifying
particular groups of interacting social actors and their activities in
particular instances of the social process of interest. Otherwise, the
mechanism schema would be too indeterminate for the purposes of
explaining the case in terms of the causal mechanism that operated in
the case. Hence, the entities in mechanism schemas cannot be con-
ceptualized, for example, in terms of population-level variables (e.g. the
average age of individuals) nor in terms of abstract categories of social
institutions or structures (e.g. democracy, capitalism or feudalism)
since, without further qualiﬁcation, these kinds of terms do not allow us
to identify any concrete social actors or their activities. Owen's (1994)
conceptualization of the liberal mechanism can be used to illustrate
these suggestions since it provides semi-abstract conceptual tools to
identify speciﬁc groups of social actors with their properties (e.g. the
notions of liberals with speciﬁc liberal ideas and liberal political elites
with perceptions about the political regimes of other countries) and
speciﬁc democratic institutions based on liberal ideas (e.g. the institu-
tions of free speech and regular competitive elections) that together
constrain the activities of statesmen and governments in liberal
democracies during international crises.
Furthermore, as many social scientists have indicated, analogical
reasoning is one way to utilize earlier theories and case studies to de-
velop new theories (e.g. Abbott, 2004; Becker, 2014; Swedberg, 2014;
Vaughan, 2014). For example, sociologist Howard Becker (2014, 40)
writes that:
One of the simplest ways to use cases to explain other, more puz-
zling cases is to reason from analogy, treating the one case you know
well as a model that will explain what you don't understand about
another one, or at least point you in the right direction, and put you
on the road to discovering a general mechanism common to both.
In this way, comparisons between cases may give rise to new me-
chanism-based explanations of cases and new mechanism schemas. In
the context of theory-building process-tracing, the analyst may also
utilize the available mechanism schemas to develop a new mechanism
schema by means of analogical reasoning. Furthermore, analogical
reasoning can be used to identify structural similarities in the accepted
mechanism schemas in order to develop more abstract classiﬁcations
and typologies of mechanism schemas in the research domain.
The third step in theory-building process-tracing involves proce-
dures whereby the analyst infers from case-based evidence that the
hypothesized causal mechanism is present in the studied case and
provides a mechanism-based explanation of the case. Again, I suggest
that this step should be re-interpreted using the notions of causal me-
chanism and mechanism schema outlined above. It is important to
realize that potentially generalizable mechanism schemas are more
abstract than mechanism-based explanations of particular cases that are
proposed by applying a particular mechanism schema. The case studies
that apply the same mechanism schema may be said to form a cluster
since the same causal mechanism may unfold somewhat diﬀerently in
diﬀerent cases because of the contextual diﬀerences. For example, the
speciﬁc contents of liberal ideas and the speciﬁc features of democratic
institutions as well as the speciﬁc activities of statesmen and govern-
ments may be slightly diﬀerent in diﬀerent cases where the liberal
mechanism schema can potentially be applied to explain how war was
avoided between two democratic states during an international crisis
(Owen, 1994). Nevertheless, since the mechanism schemas that are
built and applied in the context of case studies are usually less abstract,
idealized and general than those developed by using formal methods, it
can be expected that situations where the same mechanism schema can
be applied to a particular case in mutually incompatible ways are re-
latively rare.
This is perhaps the most contested step in theory-building process-
tracing since it can be claimed that it is always possible that there are
two or more mutually incompatible mechanism schemas that are
compatible with all case-based facts. Although this may be true in
principle, it does not necessarily follow that it forms an insurmountable
obstacle to theory-building process-tracing in practice (cf. Beach &
Pedersen, 2013, pp. 89–90). There are two reasons for this: ﬁrst, as
already repeatedly indicated, mechanism schemas developed in case
studies are usually not only less abstract and idealized but also more
detailed than those developed by using formal methods or agent-based
modeling. For this reason, it is not an easy task to come up with many
plausible mechanism schemas that would each provide alternative ex-
planations for the outcome in the studied case and would all be com-
patible with the relevant mechanistic evidence. Second, in contrast to
large-N studies, single-case research designs usually allow the analyst to
acquire new independent mechanistic evidence that she can use to
discriminate between competing accounts of the component parts and
stages of a causal mechanism (or between competing mechanism
schemas). When iterated, this procedure may well result in situations
where there are no plausible competing explanations to the one based
on a particular mechanism schema although there may be other ex-
planations that complement it. This is what Beach and Pedersen (2013,
18; 89–90) expect to occur in successful theory-building process-tra-
cing. Though we may now have an empirically supported mechanism-
based explanation of the case under study, other studies are needed to
determine how general the mechanism schema turns out to be and to
specify its scope conditions. This view is in line with Owen’s (1994,
102–105) study since he admits that his account of the liberal me-
chanism for democratic peace requires that further case studies are
conducted to empirically test his theory.
8. Conclusion
Beach and Pedersen's (2013; 2016) account of theory-building
process-tracing is an attempt to specify how new middle-range theories
about causal mechanisms may be developed through case studies. In
this paper, I not only identiﬁed some ambiguities and problems in their
notions of causal mechanisms and middle-range theories. I also showed
how they can be resolved by clarifying and elaborating these two
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concepts. This allowed me to propose some revisions and amendments
to their account of theory-building process-tracing. I did not oﬀer a full
analysis nor a defense of Beach and Pedersen's assumptions about
causation and within-case causal inferences that are, at least to some
extent, presupposed in both versions of theory-building process-tracing
discussed above. Since these assumptions are controversial among so-
cial scientists and philosophers of the social sciences, it can be expected
that Beach and Pedersen's work will be further debated.
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